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SIGNIFICANT RECENT LEGISLATIVE
DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE AIR LAW
PRACTITIONER
NICHOLAS GILMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE CHALLENGE of investigating, culling and recording significant, recent legislative developments for presentation to the

air law practitioner requires the balancing of the personal interest
and focus of the writer with the wider scope of truly significant

developments in the spectrum of air law practice. Only a clairvoyant could accurately predict the recent developments of true significance, and this writer is not so gifted. Nevertheless, the legislative developments presented should furnish the majority of air law

practitioners with a brief synopsis of potentially important, recent
legislation.
II.

PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION

The Risk Retention Act bill presented before the last session of
Congress was not enacted. Had it passed, the Act would have made
it possible for manufacturers to form risk retention groups to selfinsure against product liability claims or to bargain collectively for
better rates with commercial insurers.
*Nicholas Gilman is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Smiley,
Olson & Gilman. He holds degrees from Stanford University (B.A.), Columbia
University (M.A.) and George Washington University (J.D.). Previously he
clerked for Judge John Biggs, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit and served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the District
of Columbia and an aviation trial attorney in the Civil Division of the United
States Department of Justice. He is presently a member of the Pennsylvania and
District
of Columbia bars and the Lawyer-Pilots and American Bar Associations.
1
H.R. 6152, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill would have permitted the
formation of risk retention groups to assist manufacturers in obtaining product
liability coverage.
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The number of enacted state product liability laws dropped from
53 new laws in 1979 to five in 1980.' This sharp drop may have
been due to the spate of tort law revisions in the previous three
years and a stabilization of the product liability insurance market.!
A. Idaho"
Effective July 1, 1980, Idaho has enacted a major modification
of its product liability law entitled the "Idaho Product Liability
Reform Act." Idaho's comprehensive revision was the only major,
state product liability law revision in 1980. This Idaho Act defines
a product's useful safe life and creates a rebuttable presumption
that after ten years, the useful safe life of a product has expired,
if it is not expressly warranted for a longer period, or other specifically enumerated conditions occur to limit this statute of repose.'
A statute of limitations bars a claim made more than two years
after the cause of action accrues.! Comparative fault applies in product liability actions and permits comparative recovery if the injured party is less responsible than the person or entity against
whom recovery is sought.'
Idaho has written into its Reform Act certain risk-assuming defenses, such as use of a known defect or misuse and alteration or
modification of the product, which act in mitigation of damages.'
"Subsequent remedial measures" such as evidence of changes in
the product's design, warnings or instructions, technological feasibility, "state of the art" or changes in the custom of the product
sellers' industry or business are not admissible under the Act to
prove a defective product, except by leave of court under especially specified conditions."
Sellers who are not manufacturers are not liable to injured parties if the manufacturers knew of the product defect and unless
2 FEDERAL STATE REPORTS, Product Liability Situation Report 1 (Jan. 1981).
1

Id.

4

IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1401 through 6-1409 (Supp. 1980).
'Id. 5 6-1409.
Old. 5 6-1403.
7 Id. IDAHO CODE § 5-219 (1979)
defines when the cause of action accrues.
8IDAHO CODE § 6-1404 (Supp. 1980).
Old. § 6-1405.
'l"d. § 6-1406.
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such sellers had (1) an opportunity to inspect the product in a
manner which would or should, in the exercise of reasonable care,
reveal the existence of the defect, (2) altered, modified or installed
the product and these actions' were the proximate cause of the injuries, (3) provided specifications which were a substantial cause
of the product's defect, or (4) the expiration date of the product
assigned to it by the manufacturer had expired prior to sale.1"
Where the manufacturer is not subject to service or is judgmentproof,1 sellers are still liable even though they are not manufacturers and are not guilty of the above specified acts or omissions. Sellers are liable even if the manufacturers knew of the product defect.
B. Other States
Illinois'P and South Dakota' have both adopted significant product liability legislation which, although enacted in 1979, became
effective in 1980. These statutes have been discussed in a previous
article.
III. ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD

Two more states have joined the substantial majority of American jurisdictions adopting some form of comparative negligence.
These states did so by detailed legislative enactments.
A. Ohio
The Ohio legislature has enacted a well-defined comparative
negligence statute" which prevents contributory negligence from
barring recovery when the claimant's negligence is "no greater than
the combined negligence of all others from whom recovery is
sought.""' Any mitigation of damages through a claim of contributory negligence must be based on specific findings of fact in a trial
by the court or on specific interrogatories from the jury. The finder
"Id. S 6-1407; FEDERAL STATE REPORTS, Product Liability Situation Report
8 (Jan. 1981)
12IDAHO CODE 5 6-1407 (Supp. 1980).
"3ILL. Ai.
STAT. ch. 83 S 22.2 (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1980).
S4 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-9-9, 20-9-10 (1979).
"Dubuc & Jones, Significant Legislative Developments in 1979 in the Field of
Aviation Law, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 921, 935-36, 938-39 (1980).
is Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1980).
17Id.

§ 2315.19(A)(1) & (C).
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of fact must designate the total amount of damages found recoverable by the complainant, but for his contributory negligence, and
the percentage of negligence attributable to each party.18 If neccessary, the court then calculates any recoverable damages using
the percentages determined by the finder of fact." Such a calculation is determined by the following formula, described in the new
statute:2°
The Portion of Damages Allocated from Each Defendant=
The Total Amount of Damages Determined x
Defendant's Percentage of NegligenceTotal Percentage of Negligence of All Defendants"1
The Ohio legislature acknowledged implicitly that lawyers (and
judges) are not usually mathematicians when it meticulously devised that formula, leaving "nothing to chance." Application of
this new standard appears intended to be prospective since its
effective date is June 20, 1980.'
B. Louisiana
Phraseology in Louisiana's Civil Law statutes may require the
Common Law practitioner to refer to a legal dictionary. Recent
results of legislative action, ' however, make Louisiana one of approximately nine states to adopt a familiar "pure comparative"
rule. This rule provides that when two or more parties are jointly
liable, they are liable in proportion to their individual fault," and
contributory negligence is a mitigation, not a complete bar, to recovery. ' If all the potentially negligent defendants are not in the
lawsuit, any party-defendant may implead third parties to enforce
contribution, regardless of whether the impleader admitted liability." This rule became effective on August 1, 1980, and is not
"1Id.§ 2315.19(B)(1) & (2).

19d. S 2315.19(C).
'-2Id. S 2315.19(A) (2).
21

Id.

' Baab v. Shockling, 61 Ohio St. 2d 55, 399 N.E.2d 87 (1980);

v. Dent, 62 Ohio St. 2d 273, 405 N.E.2d 284 (1980).
13 LA.

CV.

CODE ANN.

art. 2103 (West 1981).

241d.
11
LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1981).
"LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2103 (West 1981).

Humphrey
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retroactive, applying only to claims arising from events that occured on or after August 1, 1980.
In conjunction with its adoption of "pure comparative" fault,
Louisiana added new requirements for jury interrogatories in cases
involving damage demands for injury, death or loss.' The required
jury interrogatories include a comprehensive list of written questions concerning such issues as the proximate cause of the injury,
death or loss, the relative fault or faults of the parties and the
total amount of the damages sustained.' Similar findings in writing
are required for the same types of claims in nonjury cases.' Louisiana has also determined legislatively that those persons whose concurring fault has caused injury, death or loss are jointly and severally liable only to the extent of their proportionate fault." All
parties retain their rights of indemnity and contribution.'
IV.. RECENTLY ENACTED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The 96th Congress may have had extremely productive legislative sessions, but the air law practitioner would find little evidence
of Congressional legislation in recent years which has specific application to his specialties. A few pertinent enactments, however,
do appear.
A. International Civil Aircraft Trade Agreement
As part of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,' the United States
became a signatory to an agreement concerning duty-free trade in
civil aircraft."' "The primary function of the Agreement is to enable the aerospace industry in each signatory nation' to compete
27

Id.

2

LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 1811(B)

29

Id.

30

LA. CODE

31LA.

(West 1979).

CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 1917 (West 1979).
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West 1979). Solvent defendants, jointly and

severally liable with impecunious defendants, are only liable to the extent of their
own proportionate fault. Daniel v. Conn, 378 So. 2d 451 (La App. 1979), aff'd,
382 So. 2d 945 (La. 1980).
IA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West 1979).
19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (Supp. III 1979).
-Id. S 2518(C).
I The signatories include the nine European Common Market Countries plus
the United States, Canada, Sweden, Japan, Norway and Switzerland. Neville, In-
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freely with its counterparts, and not with foreign governments with
which foreign manufacturers are often integrated."' " United States'
aerospace industries, including labor, should benefit from the "free"
competition, due to the United States' present lead in aerospace
technology even though its percentage share of the aerospace market is decreasing.Y United States' airlines should also benefit from
duty-free access to the "best" product, wherever it is made."
Just as important as elimination of tariff barriers, the signatory
states have eliminated certain jingoistic restrictions to "free" trade
in civil aircraft trade.39 For example, the President may now waive
any "Buy American Act"' requirements in order to implement the
new law.' This law, which took effect on January 1, 1980,' should
continue to assist the United States in its international balance of
payments through a successful pursuit of future, civilian aerospace
exports.
B. Equal Access to Justice Act
In a reaction to "too much government regulation," Congress
appended to the Small Business Act amendments of 1980 ' the
"Equal Access to Justice Act." The stated purpose of this Act is to
assist individuals, partnerships, small corporations, labor and other
modestly financed organizations to create a more equal adjudication or civil action when the United States and its agencies engage
in "unreasonable governmental action."' The Act has created a
significant exception to the "American Rule" against the awarding
of attorney's fees. This Act permits such awards to citizens who
ternational Trade in Civil Aircraft, 14 THE INT'L LAw. 275 n.4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Neville].
I Id. at 276.
Id. at 279.
I1
3' Id. at 280.
9Id.
at 276.
40 Buy American Act-Supply and Service Contracts, 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-6.100.105 (1980).
41 19 U.S.C. § 2513 (Supp. III 1979).
'Neville, supra note 34, at 278.
- 5 U.S.C.A. § 504 (Supp. 1981).
"Equal Access to Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 201, 94 Stat. 2325
(1980).
4ld. See also 28 U.S.C.A. 5 2412(c)(2) (Supp. 1981) (a bad faith finding
against an agency will require that the judgment be taxed against that agency specifically).
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prevail in litigation." To further equalize the battle, it allows the
prevailing party to recover potentially onerous expert witness
fees, necessary test data analyses, and other litigation costs incurred
during suit against the United States and its agencies."7
The fact that this Act was attached to a Small Business Act
amendment is an indication that Congress was convinced of the
inherently unfair advantage the United States has held against
small businesses and organizations and ordinary citizens. ' To be
eligible under the Act, the net worth of an individual must not exceed $1,000,000 and that of a business entity or association must
not exceed $5,000,000 at the time the adjudication is initiated. 9
Tort actions against the United States are specifically excluded
from the Act.'
This new law takes effect on October 1, 1981, and will apply to any adjudication or civil action as defined under 5 U.S.C.
§504(b) (1)(C) or permitted under 28 U.S.C. §2412 "which is
pending on or commenced on or after" October 1, 1981." It appears from the stated Congressional purpose and the wording of
the Act itself that practitioners who seek relief for their clients from
Federal Aviation Administration or other federal agency action
will benefit from this Act. At least it will encourage and assist inadequately financed challenges to government action where the
likelihood of success exists. The Equal Access to Justice Act, however, was instituted as an experiment, and terms within the Act
cause its automatic repeal on October 1, 1984, although any action
pending on that date will continue to be covered by the Act."
C. Sanctions Against the Vexatious Lawyer
It has been said that one cannot legislate against immoral conduct or bad manners. Legislatures, however, have consistently ignored that aphorism. The 96th Congress may be no exception.
- 5 U.S.C.A. § 504 (Supp. 1981).
1Id. §§ 504(a)(1) & (b)(1); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2) (Supp. 1981).

4

481d.
49

d.

5028 U.S.C.A. S 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1981).
"Equal Access to Judgment Act. Pub. L. No. 96-481,
(1980).

"'Id.§§ 203(c), 204(c), 94 Stat. 2327 (1980).

§ 208, 94 Stat. 2325
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Buried in the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980,"
but adopted generally for federal courts, is a sanction against attorneys and others who delay litigation vexatiously and unreasonably." This new statute reads as follows:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct."
This new sanction may not encourage good manners, but it may
discourage harassment or other unreasonable conduct which is
clearly undertaken to delay the proceedings.
D. Liability of Civil Air Patrol While Fulfilling Air Force Missions
The Civil Air Patrol has traditionally fulfilled adjunct duties in
support of the Department of the Air Force. Such duties have included search and rescue missions of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP)
under the direction of the Air Force. In recent years, a number of
aircraft accidents and incidents have occurred resulting in deaths,
injuries and financial loss both to those involved in such search and
rescue missions and to others.' Difficult determinations as to the
status of CAP employees and their conduct while operating Air
Force supported missions has stirred Congress to clarify the role
and responsibility of the CAP as an instrumentality of the Air
Force and the United States.
Attached to the Department of Defense Authorization Act of
1981"' is a section concerning the role of the Air Force in support
of the CAP and the status of the CAP as an adjunct governmental
entity." Of special interest to the air law practitioner is language
from the amended statute concerning civil liability of the CAP,
which reads:
- 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1314 (Supp. 1981).
U.S.C.A. § 1927 (Supp. 1981).
5 Id.
"See, e.g., Eskhoff v. CAP, No. 79-A-1789 (D. Colo., filed Feb. 8, 1979);
Kiker v. Estep, 444 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
7
5 Pub. L. No. 96-342, 94 Stat. 1077 (1980).
58 10 U.S.C.A, S 9441 (Supp. 1981).
-28
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The Secretary may use the services of the Civil Air Patrol in fulfilling the noncombat missions of the Department of the Air Force,
and for purposes of determining the civil liability of the Civil Air
Patrol (or any member thereof) with respect to any act or omission committed by the Civil Air Patrol (or any member thereof)
in fulfilling such mission, the Civil Air Patrol shall be deemed to
be an instrumentality of the United States."
The Civil Air Patrol, when fulfilling Air Force sponsored missions, is an instrumentality of the United States and therefore its
liability is determined under the Federal Tort Claims Act." The
United States Treasury can now be tapped to pay damages
awarded in claims against the CAP arising from its operations in
support of the Air Force. Concomitantly, however, all the jurisdictional61 and purely governmental (i.e., non-private) exclusions"
and governmental immunities also exist to prevent recovery. The
results turn out to be "a mixed blessing."
E. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Although the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976" was
enacted to take effect prior to 1980, this Act has in its short history
already provided a jurisdictional basis in numerous aviation tort
cases against foreign, government-owned air carriers.' The Act's
present and future relevance to air law should not be doubted. The
express purpose of this Act is "to provide when and how parties'
can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the
59Id.

6028 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).

"Id. S 2680(a)-(h).
"See

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).

"See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959); cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (absolute immunity for
congressional committee members under the Speech or Debate Clause insofar as
they engaged in legislative action).
-428 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
6See
e.g., Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd
mem. 607 F.2d 494 (1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36
(D.D.C. 1979); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d. Cir. 1980).
""Parties" has been interpreted to include both United States' citizens and
foreign nationals. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp.
1284, 1291-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.66 [4] (2d ed.
1980).
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courts of the United Statese ' and to provide when a foreign state is
entitled to sovereign immunity."' 8
The basic assumption set forth in this Act is that a foreign
sovereign is immune from the jurisdiction of United States' courts
unless subject to one of the stated exceptions.' Those exceptions,
other than the ones embodied in specific agreements among nations to which the United States is a party,70 are enumerated in the
general exceptions7' and counterclaims 7 2 sections. Jurisdiction over
the foreign state or its commercial entity still requires the necessary minimum contacts and adequate notice." A foreign, government-owned commercial entity is treated under the Act like a
foreign state or any political subdivision of a foreign state, except for the method of service' and liability for punitive damages. '
One of the purposes of the Act was the elimination of attachments of a foreign sovereign's property in order to create jurisdiction, a long existing cause of significant friction in the foreign relations of the United States." The second important assumption
under the Act is that property of a foreign sovereign is immune
from attachment and execution.7 ' The Act, however, then sets out
significant exceptions to this immunity."9 It appears reasonable to
assume, as a general principle, that if jurisdiction can be had
under the Act, execution of a judgment, including attachment, is
probably feasible. The Act even provides for attachment to secure
a judgment "that has been or may ultimately be entered against
67 "[Clourts of the United States" includes both federal and state courts. See
28 U.S.C. § 1602, 1605 (1976). Federal venue is defined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(1976).

* HR. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6604 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; See also
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
CODE CONG.

6928 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
70

Id.

(1976); HousE REPORT, supra note 68, at 18-22.
(1976); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 23.
(1976); HousE REPORT, supra note 68, at 13-14.
(1976).
(1976).
(1976).
77 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 26-27.
'28 U.S.C. § 1609, 1611 (1976).
79 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).
7128 U.S.C. S 1605
7228 U.S.C. § 1607
-28 U.S.C. § 1330
-428 U.S.C. 5 1603
-28 U.S.C. § 1608
-28 U.S.C. 5 1606
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the foreign state."8 Attachment merely to obtain jurisdiction is
expressly prohibited.81
V. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

A. Federal Tort Claims Act Amendments
Individual employees of the United States82 have theoretically
been subject to personal liability in tort, as has the United States
itself since the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act." Most federal employees do not carry liability insurance, however, and none
has the financial assets of his employer. In the last several decades,
Congress has awakened to the obvious, potentially disasterous liability of government officers and employees acting within the
scope of their office or employment. A line of special legislation
has been enacted protecting the assets of specific types of government officers and employees by substituting the employer, the
United States, for the individual, making the remedy one exclusively against the United States.' At present, however, the general
body of federal officials and employees is unprotected from personal liability incurred while acting within the scope of federal employment.
In recent years, Congress has been considering legislation to
amend the Federal Tort Claims Act to provide for a generally exclusive remedy against the United States for all government employees.' Should such a bill be enacted, government employees
8028 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (2) (1976).
81 Id.
82 A government employee has been defined to include "officers and employees
of any federal agency" but excludes "any contractor with the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 267 (1976), See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976).
- 28 U.S.C. §5 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
"See e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1976) (remedy against Central Intelligence
Agency and Department of Defense medical personnel); 22 U.S.C. § 817(a)
(1976) (remedy against Department of State and Agency for International Development medical personnel); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1976) (remedy against
drivers of government vehicles); 38 U.S.C. S 4116(a) (1976)(remedy against
Veterans Administration medical personnel); 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (1976) (remedy against Public Health Service personnel); 42 U.S.C. 5 2476(k)(3)(B)
(1976) (exclusive remedy under Swine Flu Act); 42 U.S.C. 5 2458a(a) (1976)
(remedy against NASA medical personnel).
85H.R. 24, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
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involved in activities related to aviation and space would no longer
be subject to personal suit in tort while acting within the scope of
their employment. Practitioners could no longer sue government
employees personally in a state court, after "blowing" the statute
of limitations under the Federal Tort Claims Act," nor could they
join individual employees with the United States for perceived tactical advantages." This bill would, however, fail to underwrite
completely certain federal employees for the commission of constitutional torts (Fourth Amendment violations)," but such claims
are not of significance to the average air law practitioner anyway.
Another proposed amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act
is the specific inclusion of the Army and Air National Guards as
employees of the United States while they are engaged in training
or on duty."' Included are malpractice actions against National
Guard medical personnel, while Guardsmen are serving pursuant
to specific sections of Title 32 of the United States Code" or pursuant to Title 37 under which a Guardsman is entitled to or has
waived pay." This bill would appear to include within the Federal
Tort Claims Act any liability incurred during a legitimate National
Guard aviation activity conducted in the line of duty.
B. Abolition of Diversity of Citizenship as a Basis of Federal Jurisdiction and Elimination of the Amount in Federal Question
Jurisdiction

Perhaps the most controversial judicial bill recently introduced
into Congress is that which seeks to abolish diversity of citizenship
""A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal Agency within two years after such
claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mail-

ing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the
agency to which it was presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
" See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201
(4th Cir. 1978).
81H.R. 24, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
'9S.

1858, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 7475, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1980).
"32

U.S.C. §§ 316, 502-505 (1976). These sections cover civilian arms train-

ing by Guard instructors as well as participating in periodic drills, field exercises,

military schools and small arms competitions.
9137 U.S.C. §§ 204, 1002 (1976).
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as a basis of federal jurisdiction." "Alienage" would be substituted
for "diversity of citizenship," 3 eliminating diversity of state citizenship as a basis for federal jurisdiction." These bills would also eliminate the present jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement
in federal question jurisdiction cases"' and would have prospective
application."
The obvious purpose of these bills is to lighten the case load in
the federal courts, and undoubtedly diversity cases add a significant
workload to the federal district courts. The abolition of diversity
jurisdiction, however, could be extremely burdensome for the air
law practitioner, particularly in major air crash litigation. The majority of such cases are brought into federal courts for the convenience of the parties, including the benefit of common discovery
where the multiple parties are from multiple jurisdictions." Further
complications could arise if some defendants, such as the United
States9 or a foreign, government-owned airline, " are removed or
have original jurisdiction in a federal court, while no such removal
or original jurisdiction is available to private defendants such as
airlines or manufacturers without diversity of citizenship. Perhaps
a reasonable compromise would be to raise the jurisdictional
amount in diversity cases instead of eliminating such jurisdiction,
but Congress appears to have rejected that solution in favor of
more drastic measures.
C. Federal Cause of Action for Aviation Activity
In at least the last three Congressional sessions, similar aviation
bills have been introduced which create a federal cause of action
"2S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979); H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
9 S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e) (1979); H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1(c) (1979).
"This would eliminate 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976) (diversity of citizenship statute).
IS. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. S 2(b) (1979); H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2 (1979); S. REP. No. 1461, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979).
16S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1979); H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
S 4 (1979).
9728 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
98Id. §§ 1346(b), 1441(a) (1976).
-Id. S 1441(d) (1976).
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with accompanying federal procedures for aviation activity."' The
entirely new chapter 174 of Title 28, United States Code, devoted
entirely to aviation activity, is comprised of these bills.'' New legal
definitions are given for common aviation activities such as "takeoff" and "landing.".. °. Furthermore, the bill creates, from no perceivable source, an exclusive and "uniform body of United States
law governing aviation activity out of which or in the course of
which arises any injury to or loss of property or any personal injury
or death."'03 It adopts as a duty the standard of the highest degree
of care which a common carrier owes its passengers."'
The rule of pure comparative fault is adopted as federal law"05
despite the fact that, at present, an overwhelming majority of states
do not permit recovery unless the party seeking it has at least been
no more negligent than the other party or parties. Damage recovery
is to be determined by the law of the state of domicile at death or,
for domiciliaries of no state of the United States, in proportion to
the loss suffered by reason of death of the decedent.'" Recompense
for the loss of care, comfort and society is included, but no recovery is available in a survival action for pain, suffering or disfigurement.""7 The bill has a two-year statute of limitation with a less
definite period of limitation for claims of contribution and indemnity."8
The bill provides for a jury trial where the right to one has already been established under the United States Constitution."' Contrary to present law, however, the bill permits a trial by jury in
actions against the United States, to the same extent as permitted
against non-governmental parties. 1' An action for wrongful death
00 Similar bills to S. 679 and H.R. 2202 in the 96th Congress are awaiting introduction in the 97th Congress. See note 96 supra.
"' H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 231, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 10917, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
102H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1"'Id. § 2751.
104Id.
1'51Id.

5 2752(a) (1) (A).

1 Id. S 2752(c).
107 Id. § 2752(d).
108Id. § 2753.
Id. S 2761.
"'°Id. § 2761(3).
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and a survival action may be brought on behalf of all the beneficiaries by one or more such beneficiaries or by the personal representative of the estate, and all claims must be brought in one
action. 1 ' The district court may appoint a personal representative
if one has not been otherwise properly appointed, and a personal
representative is qualified to serve in any district." '
Although the bill does not suggest that aviation tort litigation
lends itself to class action treatment, it does provide for the notification through court order of the pendency of a court action "to
persons who there is reason to believe have or may have claims
arising out. of the same transaction or occurrence.' '.. Service of process is nationwide, as is the subpoena power for subpoenae ad testificandum with a court order. '
Concurrent jurisdiction of the federal district courts and state
courts exists for more serious aviation accidents."' This concurrent
jurisdiction is provided for accidents arising out of aviation activity
by (a) large aircraft, (b) high performance aircraft, (c) public
aircraft, or (d) common carrier aircraft or for accidents arising
out of an occurrence which results in the death of five or more persons." State courts also have concurrent jurisdiction in suits
against the United States under this bill."'
Despite the fact that the bill already contains numerous changes
and radical departures from present law and procedures, it has an
entire section devoted to aviation actions in multidistrict litigation"' which substantially changes the existing multidistrict procedures under section 1407 of Title 28, United States Code. The salient features of this new multidistrict procedure are as follows:
1. The creation of new venues such as the situs of the takeoff or
landing out of which or in the course of which the claim arose
or the first landing made at the end of the flight out of which
the claim arose.
Id. § 2762(a).
11"Id. S 2762(b).
1111d. S 2763(2)(c).
114
Id. 2764.
I'sId. § 1364.
116
Id.
11"Id.
118 Id. § 1408
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2. Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 will be not only for discovery
and pretrial proceedings but for any or all purposes.
3. The power in the transferee court to make any orders and decisions concerning any matters pertaining to any action in the
said litigation in the interests of "efficient administration of
justice.' ' 19
In tort actions against the United States, the bill provides for
venues in addition to those available presently under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.1" These additional venues, added to those already existing in the residence of the plaintiff and the situs of the
act or omission complained of, lie in the District of Columbia, the
judicial district in which occurs the takeoff or landing out of which
or in the course of which the claim arose, or the judicial district in
which the first landing was made at the end of the flight out of
which the claim arose.1"' In theory, venue could be proper in any
of six federal judicial districts.
Another significant change involves new criteria and procedures
for removal to federal district courts.12 Any party may petition for
removal within thirty days in the case of non-defendant parties,
and no bond is required." In addition, the commencement of time
in which to petition for removal is restarted if the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation orders coordinated or consolidated proceedings under the old section 1407 of Title 28, United States
Code, or under the new multidistrict procedures contained in the
bill itself.'

Finally, although the proposed Act does not, as a general proposition, become effective until the date and time of its enactment,"
several retrospective applications do occur. Where new original
jurisdiction is created in state and federal courts, the application of
that jurisdiction is retroactive, and regardless of any repeal or limitation of jurisdiction in the proposed Act, no court is deprived of
jurisdiction over any matter pending before it at the time of the
119 Id.

1-H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1981).
121

Id.

"'H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1981).
123Id.
124Id.
12

H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 14 (1981).
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enactment.'26 The proposed Act does not overrule the "law of the
case" in pending actions if to do so "would not be feasible or would
work injustice."'' .
There is no doubt that our system of aviation tort litigation
needs improvement, yet the radical changes in H.R. 1027 or its
direct antecedents make foreseeable some problems greater than
those intended to be solved. For example, experienced aviation
plaintiff's counsel can remove state cases which are not his own
and then transfer them to the venue of his choice. The "uniform
body of United States law governing aviation activity" called on
to prevail is not really uniform, and no extensive "body" of federal
aviation tort law presently exists. The Federal Tort Claims Act
decisions in aviation tort cases are all based on the substantive
laws of the several states, which are selectively chosen or ignored
in order to conform to the specifically articulated requirement of
that Act. Before any such radical aviation bill can be touted as the
ultimate cure, it should be fully studied by practitioners, scholars
and the government. Such study does not appear to have been
given to this bill and serious questions exist as to its ultimate utility
as it is drafted.
D. Federal Court Improvement
One aspect of the attempts of the last Congress to "improve" the
Federal Courts was the introduction of a bill intended to create an
appellate forum capable of exercising jurisdiction throughout the
United States where Congress determines that there exists a special
need for national uniformity."8 The obvious national forum would
combine the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, both located in Washington, D.C. Sponsors of that bill
and its predecessors" 9 considered including exclusive review of
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) appeals in this proposed "national" intermediate
federal appellate court. Along with Interstate Commerce Commis126
Id.
127

Id.

" S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).

" S. 677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) and S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1979).

894

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[46

sion appeals, exclusive review of CAB and FAA appeals would
give the court a certain transportation expertise, but such a specialized expertise might give no better results than the present system of review in the federal circuit courts.

